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Abstract. Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) architectures are gaining popularity for building open, distributed, and evolving  
information systems. Unfortunately, despite considerable work in the fields of software architecture and MAS during the last 
decade, few research efforts have aimed at defining languages for designing and formalising secure agent architectures. This 
paper proposes a novel Architectural Description Language (ADL) for describing Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) secure MAS. 
We specify each element of our ADL using the Z specification language and we employ two example case studies: one to 
assist us in the description of the proposed language and help readers of the article to better understand the fundamentals of the 
language; and one to demonstrate its applicability.  
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1. Introduction 
The characteristics and expectations of 
new application areas for the enterprise, 
such as e-business, knowledge management, 
peer-to-peer computing, and web services, 
are deeply modifying information systems 
engineering. Most of the systems designed, 
for this kind of application areas, are now de 
facto concurrent and distributed. They tend 
to be open and dynamic, in that they exist in 
a changing organizational and operational 
environment where new components can be 
added, modified, or removed at any time. It 
is also important that such systems are 
secure, since they are often used for the 
management and storage of sensitive 
information, such as medical, financial and 
private data.  
Given these needs, many researchers are 
looking for paradigms that will enable them 
to conceptualize, design and implement 
information systems that can operate 
effectively in such circumstances. In this 
context, we advocate the use of Multi-Agent 
Systems (MAS) to build today’s enterprise 
information systems. MAS architectures 
appear to be more flexible, modular and 
robust than traditional; including object-
oriented ones. MAS do represent dynamic 
and evolving structures and components, 
which can change at run-time to benefit 
from the capabilities of new system entities 
or replace obsolete ones. Moreover, MAS 
represent a suitable paradigm for the 
consideration of security challenges 
introduced by the current information 
systems. Security issues, within an agent 
system context, will require for the agents of 
the system to consider the security 
requirements, when specifying their 
objectives and interactions, and therefore 
cause the propagation of security 
requirements to the whole system [34]. 
However, as the expectations of business 
stakeholders are changing day after day; and 
as the complexity of systems, information 
and communication technologies and 
organisations is continually increasing in 
today’s dynamic environments; developers 
are expected to produce architectures that 
must handle more difficult and intricate 
requirements than ever before.  
A critical issue in the design and 
construction of any complex information 
system is its architecture. That is, its gross 
organization as a collection of interacting 
components. A rigorous architectural design 
can ensure that a system will satisfy key 
requirements in such areas as performance, 
reliability, portability, scalability, and 
interoperability [40]. To assist developers in 
specifying information system architectures, 
architectural description languages are used. 
An Architectural Description Language 
(ADL) provides a concrete syntax for 
specifying architectural abstractions in a 
descriptive notation. Architectural 
abstractions concern the structure of the 
system’s components, their behaviour, and 
their interrelationships. 
Unfortunately, despite the progress on the 
field of software architectures (see for 
instance [2], [17], [28], [30], [39]) and the 
simultaneous progress on MAS research; 
few research efforts have aimed at truly 
defining description languages for MAS 
architectures, and even these do not 
adequately include important issues of MAS 
such as security. This paper deals with this 
problem and it proposes a novel ADL for 
MAS, which defines a “core” set of 
structural, behavioural and security 
concepts, including relationships and 
constraints, which are fundamental for a 
complete MAS ADL. The language, called 
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SKwyRL-ADL2, aims to describe secure 
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) MAS.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 overviews the notions of agent and MASs 
and identifies the main concepts of the BDI 
model, which is used in our ADL. Section 3 
discusses security in MAS and Section 4 
models SKwyRL-ADL using the Z 
specification language. An example case 
study is used to assist reader understanding 
of the language’s elements. Section 5 
demonstrates the applicability of the 
proposed ADL with the aid of a real case 
study from the e-media domain. Section 6 
describes related work; it indicates how that 
work has influenced the presented work, and 
it discusses how the presented work differs 
from related work. The last section 
summarizes the contributions of the paper 
and discusses future work.  
2. Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 
An agent defines a system entity, situated 
in some environment that is capable of 
flexible autonomous action in order to meet 
its design objectives [46]. Three key 
concepts support this definition: 
• Situatedness: an agent receives input 
from the environment it operates and can 
perform actions, which change the 
environment in some way; 
• Autonomy: an agent is able to operate 
without direct, continuous supervision. 
In other words it has full control over its 
own actions; 
• Flexibility: an agent is not only reactive 
but also pro-active. Reactivity means 
that an agent has perceptions of the 
                                                 
2 Socio-Intentional ArChitecture for Knowledge 
Systems & Requirements ELicitation (www.isys.ucl.ac.be/ 
skwyrl) 
world, which force the agent to act and 
react to change in quasi real-time 
fashion. Pro-activeness means that an 
agent’s behaviour is not exclusively 
reactive but it is also driven by internal 
goals, i.e. an agent may take initiative. 
With these concepts in mind, a MAS can 
be defined as a set of autonomous and 
proactive agents that interact with each other 
to achieve common or private goals. This 
definition leads us to two different types of 
MAS: Cooperative or Competitive.  
A Cooperative MAS has a unique high-
level global goal (or set of goals) 
decomposed recursively into parallel 
activities to be performed by the set of 
agents that compose that MAS. This kind of 
system is typically adapted to perform 
distributed problem solving. In a 
Competitive MAS, each of the component 
agents has its own set of goals that may or 
may not meet those of other agents. In this 
case the MAS is an architecture that allows 
agents to interact, while each one pursues 
personal goals and defends own interests. 
This kind of system meets typical 
engineering requirements of e-commerce, 
information retrieval applications, web 
services or peer-to-peer networks. In such 
environments, every agent generally 
represents either a client, aiming at 
obtaining some resources or have some 
service accomplished; or a provider, aiming 
at selling resources or services at a certain 
(not necessarily financial) cost. Each agent 
pursues the goals of the (human or system) 
actor it represents, and these goals can 
usually be in conflict. 
In order to reason about these goals and 
act in an autonomous way, agents are 
usually built on rationale models and 
reasoning strategies that have roots in 
various disciplines including Artificial 
Intelligence, Cognitive Science, Psychology 
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or Philosophy. Agent models are 
proliferating; some include learning 
capabilities, others intelligent agendas based 
on statistics, others yet are based on genetic 
algorithms and so on. An exhaustive 
evaluation of these models is out of the 
scope of this paper or even this research 
work. However, a simple yet powerful and 
mature model coming from Cognitive 
Science and Philosophy that has received a 
great deal of attention, notably in Artificial 
Intelligence, is the Belief-Desire-Intention 
(BDI) model [6]. This approach has been 
intensively used to study the design 
rationale of agents and is proposed as a 
keystone model in numerous agent-oriented 
development environments such as JACK3 
or JADE4. The main concepts of the BDI 
agent model are (except the notion of agent 
itself that we have just explained): 
• Beliefs that represent the informational 
state of a BDI agent, that is, what the 
agent knows about itself and the world;  
• Desires (or goals) that are its 
motivational state, that is, what the agent 
is trying to achieve; 
• Intentions that represent the deliberative 
state of the agent, that is, what plans the 
agent has chosen for possible execution. 
In particular, a BDI agent has a set of 
plans, which defines sequences of actions 
and steps available to achieve a certain goal 
or react to a specific situation. The agent 
reacts to events, which are generated by 
modifications to its beliefs, additions of new 
goals, or messages arriving from the 
environment or from another agent.  An 
event may trigger one or more plans; the 
agent commits to execute one of them, that 
is, it becomes its intention. Plans are 
                                                 
3 http://www.agent-software.com.au/jack.html 
4 http://jade.tilab.com 
executed one step at a time. A step can 
query or change the beliefs; it can perform 
actions on the external world; and it can 
submit new goals. The operations performed 
by a step may generate new events that, in 
turn, may start new plans. A plan succeeds 
when all its steps have been completed; it 
fails when certain conditions are not met. 
3. MAS and Security 
Security of software systems, agent-
oriented, object-oriented or otherwise, is 
concerned with methods providing cost 
effective and operationally effective 
protection from undesirable events[30]. In 
principle security is usually defined in terms 
of the existence of any of the following 
properties: 
• Confidentiality: The property of 
guaranteeing information is only 
accessible to authorized entities and 
inaccessible to others; 
• Authentication: the property of proving 
the identity of an entity; 
• Integrity: the property of assuring that 
the information remains unmodified 
from source entity to destination entity; 
• Access Control: the property of 
identifying the access rights an entity 
has over system resources; 
• Non-repudation: the property of 
confirming the involvement of an entity 
in certain communication; 
• Availability: the property of 
guaranteeing the accessibility and 
usability of information and resources to 
authorized entities. 
In MAS, each of these properties is 
associated with the characteristics of agents 
and need to be considered during the 
development. For instance, regarding 
situatedness [46], the authentication, 
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confidentiality and availability of an agent 
needs to be considered according to the 
environment in which the agent operates.  
On the other hand, the social behaviour 
property of an agent involves 
communication with other agents and other 
entities and as such the properties of non-
repudiation, integrity and access control are 
important. Therefore, it is crucial for the 
agents of a MAS to consider, during run-
time, the systems’ and their individual 
security requirements when specifying their 
objectives and interactions. For this to 
happen, agent developers must integrate 
security considerations when they define the 
architecture of their MAS [4].  However, 
research efforts so far have been mainly 
focused on the solution of individual 
security problems of MAS, such as attacks 
from an agent to another agent, attacks from 
a platform to an agent, and attacks from an 
agent to a platform. Developers of MAS 
ADLs have mainly neglected security and 
have failed to provide evidence of 
successfully integrating security concepts as 
part of their ADLs. As a result, MAS 
developers find no help when considering 
security during the architectural design of a 
MAS.  
4. SKwyRL: An Architectural Language 
for Secure MAS 
4.1. ADL Concepts 
Architectural description languages are 
formal languages that are used to specify the 
architecture of a system [40]. By 
architecture, we mean the components that 
compose a system, the behavioural 
specification for those components, and the 
mechanisms for interactions among them. 
Based on our analysis of existing literature 
(see Section 6 for a discussion of related 
work), we have identified the following 
concepts as the common foundation of 
concepts and concerns for system 
architecture descriptions:  
Component. Components are units of 
computation and data store. Therefore, 
components are loci of computation and 
state. A component, in architecture, may be 
as small as a single procedure (e.g., Wright 
[1] procedures) or as large as an entire 
application (e.g., hierarchical components in 
Rapide [28]). It may require its own data 
and/or execution space, or it may share them 
with other components. 
Interface. Interfaces are set of interaction 
points among components and the external 
world. All ADLs support specification of 
component interfaces. They differ in 
terminology and the kinds of information 
they specify. For example, each interface 
point in ACME [17]and Wright is called a 
port. In UniCon [39], an interface point is a 
player, and in Rapide a constituent. In 
Darwin [29], the interface consists of a 
collection of services that are either 
provided or required.  
Type. A type describes how architectural 
element representation is built up. ADLs 
can support reuse by modelling abstract 
components as types and instantiating them 
in an architectural configuration. All the 
surveyed ADLs distinguish component 
types from instances. However, UniCon and 
Darwin lack explicit means of introducing 
new component types, as they support only 
a predefined set. Other ADLs such as 
Rapide and Wright make explicit use of 
parameterisation.  
Connector. Connectors are used to model 
interactions among components and the 
rules that govern those interactions. Some 
ADLs that model connectors as first-class 
entities are called explicit configuration 
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languages, as opposed to in-line 
configuration languages. The first-class 
includes languages such as Wright. On the 
other hand, Rapide and Darwin are 
examples of in-line configuration languages. 
In these languages, connectors cannot be 
named. They are described solely in terms 
of bindings between the provided service of 
a component and the required service of 
another component.  
Configuration. Configurations (or 
topologies) are connected graphs of 
components and connectors that describe 
architectural structures. Configurations are 
needed to determine whether appropriate 
components are connected, their interfaces 
match and their combined semantics result 
in desired behaviour. Descriptions of 
configurations enable the assessment of 
concurrent and distributed aspects of 
architecture, e.g., potential for deadlocks 
and starvation, performance, reliability, 
security, etc. Configurations also enable 
analysis for adherence to design heuristics 
and style constraints. In this sense, a major 
role of configuration is to facilitate the 
understanding of systems at a high level of 
abstraction. Therefore, configurations must 
model structural information with simple 
and understandable syntax.  
Hierarchical Composition. A 
hierarchical composition allows the 
representation of an entire architecture as a 
single component in another, larger 
architecture. Several ADLs provide explicit 
features to support hierarchical composition. 
For example ACME provides templates, 
Darwin composition elements, and UniCon 
and Wright maps.  
4.2. The GOSIS example  
To assist understanding the specification 
of the language components, we represent 
extracts of the aGent-Oriented Source 
Integration System (GOSIS) architecture to 
compliment our theoretical description of 
the language. GOSIS provides a MAS 
architecture that supports the integration of 
data coming from dynamic, distributed and 
heterogeneous sources. GOSIS is a hybrid 
approach that combines the advantages of 
in-advance and on-demand processes[15]. In 
such an approach, the user information 
needs can be extracted in-advance or on-
demand by the mediator. The information 
extracted in-advance is stored in a central 
database managed by the mediator. The 
information contents of this central database 
can be seen as a materialized view where the 
database resides at the information sources. 
In this way, in comparison with a basic 
mediator, a hybrid mediator adds 
functionalities essentially in order to 
perform materialized view maintenance.  
In particular, when a user wishes to send a 
request, it contacts the broker agent, which 
serves as an intermediary to select one or 
more mediator(s) that can satisfy the user 
information needs. Then, the selected 
mediator(s) firstly decomposes the user’s 
query into one or more sub-queries 
regarding the appropriate information 
sources and then it eventually compiles and 
synthesizes results from the source and 
returns the final result to the broker. When 
the mediator identifies repetitively the same 
user information needs, this information of 
interest is extracted from each source, 
merged with relevant information from the 
other sources, and stored as knowledge by 
the mediator. Each of the stored knowledge 
bases constitutes a materialized view that 
the mediator has to keep up-to-date. 
Moreover, two types of agents, a wrapper 
and a monitor, are connected to each 
information source. The wrapper is used to 
translate the sub-query issued by the 
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mediator in the native format of the source 
and also to translate the source response in 
the data model used by the mediator. The 
monitor is responsible for detecting changes 
of interest (e.g., a change which affects a 
materialized view) in the information source 
and for reporting them to the mediator. 
Changes are then translated by the wrapper 
and sent to the mediator. 
It may also be necessary for the mediator 
to obtain information concerning the 
localisation of a source, and for the 
associated wrapper to provide current or 
future relevant information. This kind of 
information is provided by the matchmaker 
agent, which allows a direct interaction 
between the mediator and the correspondent 
wrapper. The matchmaker plays the role of a 
“yellow-page” agent. Each wrapper 
advertises its capabilities by subscribing to 
the yellow page agent. Finally, the multi-
criteria analyzer reformulates a sub-query 
(sent by a mediator to a wrapper) through a 
set of criteria in order to express the user 
preferences in a more detailed way, and 
refines the possible domain of results. 
4.3. The ADL concepts 
Following the identification of the 
common foundation of components 
necessary for an ADL; an architecture based 
on the proposed SKwyRL-Architectural 
Description Language (ADL) includes the 
following concepts:  
• Component. In SKwyRL-ADL, we 
consider an agent as a system 
component with a set of plans 
determining its computation dimension 
and a set of beliefs defining its data 
space. 
• Interface. SKwyRL-ADL specifies an 
interface point in the same way as 
ACME and Wright, with the difference 
that a port is either a sensor requiring a 
service or an effector providing a service 
for the agent environment. In this sense, 
like Darwin, an interface can be seen as 
a collection of provided or required 
services. 
• Type. We introduce parameterisation in 
order to distinguish the different 
instances of each agent type that can 
appear in a configuration or to expand 
an agent description from a single 
system to families of systems. SKwyRL-
ADL permits any part of an agent 
description to be replaced with a 
“placeholder”, which is then filled with 
a parameter when the type is 
instantiated. 
• Connector. SKwyRL-ADL follows the 
Rapide and Darwin notion of connectors 
according to the definition of agent 
interaction that we will discuss in the 
following section. 
• Configuration. Because Wright offers 
the most complete and formal definition 
of configuration specification, we follow 
it with the aim of describing a complete 
system architecture. Like a Wright 
configuration description, the 
components (i.e., agent) and connectors 
(i.e., bindings between provided and 
required services) must be combined 
into a configuration. In this sense, in 
SKwyRL-ADL, a configuration is a 
collection of agent instances combined 
via bindings between provided and 
required services.  
• Hierarchical Composition. SKwyRL-
ADL allows for hierarchical 
composition, but provides no specific 
constructs to support it. In particular, 
SKwyRL-ADL permits replacing basic 
components in an architecture by a (sub) 
configuration so as to form a new 
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configuration. This is done by 
supporting the specification of an agent 
by one or more detailed lower-level 
descriptions. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Conceptualization of SKwyRL-ADL. 
4.4. Metamodel 
Figure 1 introduces the main entities and 
relationships of the elements of SKwyRL-
ADL. Each entity has been identified from 
the generic features of current ADLs, from 
architectural security considerations, and 
from the concepts defined through the 
theoretical BDI architecture model. 
For clarity we have further subdivided the 
model into three sub-models: the agent 
model; the security model; and the 
architectural model. The three following 
sub-sections describe these models in 
greater detail. Each entity is formalized 
using the Z specification language [41]. We 
have adopted Z in order to formalize the 
concepts and relationships of our ADL 
model for a number of reasons. Firstly, Z 
provides modularity and abstraction and is 
sufficiently expressive to allow for a 
consistent, unified and structured account of 
Knowledge Base
Security Mechanism
Belief Security Method
Action
1
1..*
Event 0..*
1..*
generate
Plan trigger
Goal
11..*
Capability
Security Constraint
1..*
1..*
restrict
1..*
1..*
restrict
Protection Objective
1..*
1..*adds
Architecture Configuration
Effector Sensor
1..*1..*
Service
0..*
1..*
generate
1..*
1..*
1..*
1..*
Agent
1..* 1..*
own
1..*
1..*
own
1..*
0..* react to
0..*
1..* has
imposed
Interface
1
0..*
possess connect to
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a software system and its associated 
operations. Such structured specifications 
enable the description of MAS architectures 
at different abstraction levels, with system 
complexity being added at successive lower 
levels. Secondly, Z is particularly suitable in 
squaring the demands of formal modelling 
with the need for implementation by 
allowing for transitions between 
specification and software. Our approach to 
formalize the specification of SKwyRL is 
thus pragmatic: we need to be formal to be 
precise about the concepts we discuss, yet 
we want to remain directly connected to 
implementation issues. 
Furthermore, Z is widely used as formal 
specification language within the software 
engineering and the artificial intelligence 
communities. Z has been shown to be clear, 
concise and relatively easy to learn 
compared with other languages [27]. 
 
4.4.1. Agent Model 
 
The agent model, illustrated in Figure 1, is 
composed of eight main design entities. An 
agent needs knowledge about its 
environment in order to make good 
decisions. Knowledge is contained in an 
agent in the form of one or many knowledge 
bases structuring its informational state. A 
knowledge base consists of a set of beliefs 
that the agent has about its environment. A 
belief represents a view of the current 
environment of an agent.  
However, beliefs about the current state of 
the environment are not always enough to 
decide what to do. In other words, in 
addition to a current state description, the 
agent needs goal information. A goal 
describes an environment state that is (or is 
not) desirable. An agent pursues one or 
more goals that represent its motivational 
state.  
The intentional behaviour of an agent is 
represented by its capabilities to react to 
events. A capability is a set of events that an 
agent can handle, post or send to its 
environment and a set of plans. An event is 
generated either by an action that modifies 
beliefs or adds new goals, or by services 
provided by another agent. Note that 
services also appear in the structural model 
because they involve interactions among 
agents that compose the MAS. 
Interactions serve as basic elements to 
support the construction of configurations. 
An event may invoke (trigger) one or more 
plans; the agent is committed to executing 
one of them, that is, it becomes its intention. 
A plan defines the sequence of actions or 
services to be chosen by the agent to 
accomplish a task or fulfil a goal. An action 
can query, add or remove beliefs, generate 
new events or submit new goals. 
As an example, consider the model shown 
in Figure 2 representing a partial 
specification of the mediator agent of the 
GOSIS case study. The Mediator agent has a 
set of interfaces, Knowledge Bases (KB), 
Protection Objectives (PO), Security 
Mechanisms (SM) and a set of Capabilities 
(CP).  
This formalization is intended as an 
intuitive aid to introduce the fundamental 
design entities and relationships, and assist 
in the comprehension of the ADL. However, 
the description level chosen here does not 
specify the details of the beliefs composing 
the KB; the plans and events composing 
each CP; or the security methods composing 
each SM. For this reason, the proposed ADL 
supports refinement specification, using the 
Z language, for each of the main aspects of 
the agent: interface, knowledge base, 
security mechanisms and capabilities. 
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Agent: { Mediator 
Interface: 
Sensor[require(query_translation)] 
Sensor[require(query reformulation)] 
Sensor[require(results)] 
Sensor[require(locate_wrapper)] 
Sensor[require(change_advertizings)] 
Effector[provide(found_items)] 
KnowledgeBase: 
Results_KB  
MatchMaker_Info_KB 
DataManagement_KB 
Request_KB 
Notification_KB 
Protection Objectives: 
Confidentiality_PO  
Availability_PO  
Security mechanisms: 
DataIntegirty_SM 
AuthenticationExchange_SM 
Capabilities: 
Handle_Request_CP 
Handle_Results_CP 
Materialized_Views_CP 
Wrapper_Localization_CP 
Handle_Change_CP 
  } 
Fig. 2: Partial specification of the GOSIS mediator agent. 
Knowledge base.  A knowledge base is a 
set of beliefs that the agent has about the 
environment and itself. A knowledge base 
(KB) is a means of structuring the 
informational state of agents and it 
encapsulates a set of states describing a 
specific part of the current environment of 
an agent. Each individual state is called a 
belief. A knowledge base specification is 
also described by the type of KB (KBtype) and 
a name that assists to identify the KB. 
Whenever an agent wants to query or 
modify a KB, it does so by using this name. 
The set of all names is denoted by [KBname] 
and a KB can be specified as in Figure 3. 
The KBtype describes the kinds of formal 
knowledge used by agents that compose the 
MAS. closedWorld states that an agent knows 
only the beliefs included in its knowledge 
base [25], and anything not in its knowledge 
base simply doesn’t exist. Inversely, 
openWorld states that an agent accepts every 
belief that it “considers” possible [21]. 
Although closed-world states do not often 
occur in the real world, they are useful in 
many simulation and programming 
environments [12]. 
 
[KBname] 
[KBtype]:=  closedWorld | openWorld 
 
KnowledgeBase 
 
name: KBname 
composed_of: ℙ Belief 
type: KBtype 
 
 
name ≠∅∧composed_of ≠∅∧type ≠∅ 
(∀kb:KnowledgeBase) (∃ ag : Agent ) •use(kb,ag) 
 
Fig. 3: KnowledgeBase specification. 
An example of a KB specification for the 
Mediator agent of the GOSIS system is 
shown in Figure 4.  In particular, three KBs 
are specified in the agent specification 
presented above: the Matchmaker_Info, 
WrapperSubscription and Translation_Management. 
The contents of these KBs concern, 
respectively, wrapper localisations and 
translation abilities; accepted and refused 
wrapper subscriptions; mediator queries and 
the specific information needed to translate 
it. This specific information is represented 
by the following beliefs: 
• source_resource that defines the kind of 
data available from the connected 
source; 
• source_modeling that describes how the 
information is structured; 
• dictionary that provides the term 
correspondence between the mediator 
and the source. 
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KnowledgeBase: {  
name: MatchMaker_Info_KB 
composed-of:    
wrapper(WrapperLocalization,TranslationServ
ice(+)) 
type: closed_world } 
 
KnowledgeBase: {  
name:WrapperSubscription_KB 
composed-of: 
refusal_subscription(Id,TranslationType,
WrapperLocalization,Reason) 
accepted_subscribe(Id,TranslationType, 
WrapperLocalization,Date)  
type: closed_world  } 
 
KnowledgeBase:  { 
name: Translation_Management_KB 
composed-of:  
search(RequestType,ProductType,Filte
redKeyword(+)) 
source_resource(InfoType(+)) 
source_modeling(SourceType,Relation(
+),Attributes(+)) 
dictionary(MediatorTerm,SourceType,C
orrespondence) 
type: closed_world} 
Fig. 4: KB specification for the GOSIS mediator agent. 
Belief. A belief is a predicate describing a 
set of states about the current agent 
environment being either true or false. 
Beliefs describe the environment of an agent 
in terms of states of objects with individual 
identities and properties, and relations on 
objects as being either true or false. We use 
predicate symbols to specify a particular 
relation that holds (or fails to hold) between 
several objects, and terms to represent 
objects. Each term can be build from 
constant, variable or function symbols. 
Constant symbols are therefore terms. But 
sometimes it is more convenient to use an 
expression to refer to an object. This is what 
function symbols are for. Thus a complex 
term can be formed by a function symbol 
followed by a parenthesized list of terms as 
arguments to the function symbol.  
From the above primitives, we can define 
an AtomicBelief. The set of all predicate, 
function, constant and variable symbols are 
denoted by [PredSymb],[Function],[Constant], and 
[Variable], respectively. An AtomicBelief is 
formed from a predicate symbol followed by 
a sequence of terms (Figure 5).  
 
[PredSymb] 
[Funtion] 
[Constant] 
[Variable] 
[Term]:=Function(Term,…)|Constant| Variable 
 
AtomicBelief 
 
head:  PredSymb 
terms:  seq Term 
 
 
head ≠∅∧terms ≠∅ 
 
Fig. 5: AtomicBelief Specification. 
A Belief is specified either as an 
AtomicBelief, a negated AtomicBelief, a series of 
AtomicBeliefs connected using logic 
connectives, or an AtomicBelief characterized 
with a temporal pattern. We use the 
following temporal patterns: ○ (in the next 
state), ● (in the previous state), ◊ (some time 
in the future), ♦ (some time in the past), □ 
(always in the future), ■(always in the past), 
W(always in the future unless), and U 
(always in the future until). 
 
[Belief]:=AtomicBelief   
|¬AtomicBelief 
| Temp_Pattern AtomicBelief                                      
               | AtomicBelief  Connective AtomicBelief
[Connective] →∧ | ∨ | ⇒ 
[Temporal_Pattern]:=○ | ● | ◊ | ♦ | □ | ■ |W |U 
 
Goal.  A goal describes an environment 
state that an agent wants to bring 
about.Beliefs about the current state of the 
environment are not always enough to 
decide what to do. In other words, in 
addition to a current state description, the 
agent needs goal information, which 
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describes situations that are (not) desirable. 
Goal information is an operational objective 
to be achieved by an agent. Operational 
means that the objective can be formulated 
in terms of appropriate state transitions 
under the control of one agent. We consider 
goals according to four patterns [10]: 
 
Achieve:  P  ⇒  ◊Q 
Pmeans “state P holds in the current 
state” 
◊Qmeans “state Q holds in the current 
or in some future state” 
Cease: P ⇒  ◊¬Q 
Maintain: P ⇒ □Q 
□Qmeans “state Q holds in the current 
and in all future states” 
Avoid: P ⇒□¬Q 
 
With respect to beliefs, goals can be 
specified as in Figure 6. 
 
[GoalPattern] :=  Achieve | Cease |  Maintain |    
                           Avoid 
[GoalStatus]:= Fulfilled | Unfulfilled 
 
Goal 
 
head:  GoalPattern 
state:  Belief 
Status: GoalStatus 
 
 
head ≠∅∧state ≠∅ 
 
(∀ g: Goal) ∧ g.status = Fulfilled 
⇒ (∃ blset = {bl1,…,bln: Belief} ∧ g.state ⊆ 
blset) 
 
Fig. 6: Goal specification. 
The state explicitly describes (in terms of 
beliefs) the environment in which the goal is 
fulfilled. The status indicates whether the 
goal has been fulfilled or not. The goal 
patterns influence the set of possible agent 
behaviours: achieve and cease goals 
generate actions, plans, or events; maintain 
and avoid goals restrict them. When a goal 
is required, the agent identifies a set of plans 
to achieve or maintain this goal. From then 
on, the agent chooses, according to its 
current beliefs, which of these plans will be 
executed. 
Capability.  A capability is a set of plans 
that an agent can execute and a set of events 
that it can post to itself or send to its 
environment. The capability is a means of 
structuring the intentional behaviour of 
agents. In a perspective of modularity, it 
allows to encapsulate a set of agent 
functionalities that can be plugged in as 
required. This component approach allows a 
system architect to build up a library. These 
components can then be (re)used to add 
selected functionality to different agents of a 
system. Also, some of these components can 
be temporally not available for the agents in 
the system. Capabilities are structured from 
a set of events, plans or sub-capabilities that 
can be combined to provide complex 
functionality. A Capability specification 
takes the form in Figure 7. 
 
[CapName]  
[AtomicCap] :=  Plan | Capability | Event 
[CapAvaibility]:= Available | Unavailable 
 
Capability 
 
name: CapName 
composed_of: ℙ AtomicCap 
availability: CapAvailability 
 
 
name ≠∅∧composed_of ≠∅ 
 
(∀ cap: Capability) ∃ ag: Agent ∧ cap ∈ ag.has ⇒ 
cap.availability = “available” 
 
Fig. 7: Capability specification 
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Referring back to the GOSIS case study, 
the mediator specification holds five 
capabilities: 
• Handle_Request decomposes a user query 
into one or more sub-queries and sends 
them to adequate wrappers; 
• Handle_Results synthesises the source 
answers and returns the answers to the 
broker; 
• Materialized_Views manages the storage, 
the updates, the queries and the results 
related to a set of materialized views;  
• Wrapper_Localization manages the 
information (provided by the 
matchmaker) concerning the localisation 
of a source and its connected wrapper; 
• Handle_Change executes the materialised 
view updates when a monitor detects 
changes from its source. 
The proposed ADL allows the 
specification of each capability with a name 
and a body (composed-of) containing the 
plans that the capability can execute and the 
events that it can post to itself (handled by 
one of these plans) or send to other agents. 
For example, the Handle_Request is specified 
as in Figure 8. 
 
Capability:  { 
name: Handle_Request_CP  
composed-of: 
Plan: DecompNmlRq  
Plan: DecompMCRq 
SendEvent: FaillUserRq 
SendEvent: FailDecompMCRq 
PostEvent: ReadyToHandleRst 
availability: available} 
Fig. 8: Handle_Request capability specification 
The concept of Event and Plan are specified 
later in this section.  
Action. An action is an internal operation 
executed in order to achieve goals or 
accomplish tasks. An operation is a basic 
executable command of agent behaviour. 
The type of operation that agents can 
perform may be classified as either external 
(the domain of the operation is the 
environment outside the agent) or internal 
(the domain of the operation is the agent 
itself). Actions concern only internal 
operations. We will explain later in the 
paper how external operations are specified 
in SKwyRL-ADL and why they play an 
important role in the definition of the system 
topology. From the set of all internal 
operations [Operation], we can specify an 
AtomicAction as in Figure 9. 
 
[Operation]  
 
AtomicAction 
 
head:  Operation 
input:Belief 
 
 
head ≠∅∧input ≠∅ 
 
Fig. 9: AtomicAction specification 
In order to design agents that present 
efficient behaviour in specific environment 
states, preconditions can be defined allowing 
the agent to choose a better action than it 
would otherwise have chosen. Once the 
action is selected, the agent can execute it. 
This affects (affect) the agent’s informational 
or motivational states (Figure 10). 
 
Output:= Belief  | Goal 
function:= Add_KB  |  Rem_KB 
[Affect]:= function  X  output 
 
Action 
 
precondition:  ℙ Belief 
body: AtomicAction 
affect: Affect 
 
 
body ≠∅∧affect ≠∅ 
 
Fig. 10: Action specification 
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Event. An event is a belief or goal 
occurrence generated by an action or a 
service, which triggers the execution of a 
plan. Events are the origin of all activity 
within an agent-oriented system. In the 
absence of events, an agent sits idle. 
Whenever an event occurs, an agent selects 
between the available plans and executes the 
selected plan (or plan set depending on the 
event processing model chosen), until it 
succeeds or fails. An event is either the 
effect of an action or a service, or it is 
exogenous to the system, resulting from an 
action or a service not accomplished by an 
agent in the system. We define an event as 
in Figure 11. 
 
[ExogEffect] 
[TriggerEvent]:=  Effect | ExogEffect 
[Evtype] = postEvent  | sendEvent 
 
Event 
 
Trigger: TriggerEvent 
destination: ℙ Agent 
type: EVtype 
 
 
Trigger ≠∅ 
 
(∀ ev: Event)  ev.type = sendEvent ⇒ ev.dest ≠∅ 
 
Fig. 11: Event specification 
SKwyRL-ADL allows the specification of 
two types of events: postEvent and sendEvent. 
A postEvent describes an event that the agent 
can post. Posting an event means that an 
agent creates an instance of the event and 
posts it internally (i.e., sends the event to 
itself). Such as event needs to be handled by 
the agent’s own plan. Inversely, a sendEvent 
identifies events that the agent sends 
externally (i.e., to another agents) or 
considered exogenous to the system. 
Plan. A plan defines a sequence of actions 
or/and services to accomplish a task or 
achieve a goal. Plans are selected by agents, 
as described below. Selected plans constrain 
the agent behaviour and act as intentions. A 
plan can be specified as in Figure 12 and 
consists of: 
• invocation condition, detailing the 
circumstances, in terms of beliefs or 
goals, that cause the plan to be triggered;  
• context, that defines the preconditions of 
the plan, i.e., what must be believed by 
the agent for a plan to be selected for 
execution;  
• the plan body, which specifies either the 
sequence of formulae that the agent 
needs to perform. A formulae being 
either an action or a service (i.e., action 
that involves interaction with other 
agents) to be executed;  
• end state, which defines the post-
conditions under which the plan is 
succeeded; 
• a set of services or actions that specify 
what happens when a plan fails or 
succeeds.  
 
[PlanName] 
[AtomicPlan]:= Action | Service 
 
Plan 
 
name: PlanName 
invocation: ℙ Event 
Context: ℙ Belief 
Body: seq AtomicPlan 
endState: ℙ Affect 
succeed: seq  Atomicplan 
Failure: seq  AtomicPlan 
 
 
name ≠  ∅∧invocation ≠  ∅∧body ≠  ∅ 
 
Fig. 12: Plan specification 
A Plan is said to have succeeded when it 
reaches its end state, and it is said to have 
failed if it is not in the end state and there 
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are no available actions or services. For 
instance, the DecompNmlRq and the 
DecompMCRq plans of the mediator agent 
deal with the decomposition of normal and 
multi-criteria (expressing the user 
preferences) requests.  
 
Plan:  { 
name:  DecompNmlRq 
invocation:  Add(Request_KB, 
  user_keyword(pt(+),kw(+)) 
/* with pt:ProductType From Mediator.Ask(user_info-
needs).reply_with and  with kw:Keyword 
FromMediator.Ask(user_info-needs).reply_with 
 context: ¬ materialized_view(ProductType 
= pt(+),Keyword = kw(+)) 
body: ∀ pt : ProducType ∈ 
user_keyword(pt(+),kw(+))   
Do 
Action: 
select_wrapper(wrapper(WrapL 
ocalization,TranslationService(+)) 
as  wp(+): Wrapper 
Service:    
performative: 
 Ask(query_translation) 
sender: Mediator 
parameters:  rt:RequestType∧ 
pt:ProductType∧ 
kw(+):Keyword 
receiver:  wp(+): Wrapper 
Affect:  
Add(Translation_Management 
_KB, search(rt,pt,kw(+)) 
End-Do 
 
endstate: ∀ pt : ProducType ∈ 
    user_keyword(pt(+),kw(+))    
Do 
Add(Translation_Management_KB, 
 search(rt,pt,fk(+)) 
End-Do 
 
suceed:     
Action:  count(search(rt,pt,kw(+)) 
Affect:  Add(Request_Kb, 
       old_user_keyword(pt,kw(+)) 
Failure:    Plan: DecompMCRq 
} 
Fig. 13: DecompNmlRq plan specification 
The DecompNmlRq plan, shown in Figure 
13, is triggered each time a new user_keyword 
belief is added to the Request KB. The 
argument values of the user_keyword belief 
are required by the Ask(user_info-needs) 
service that the mediator initiates. However, 
the plan is only executed if a materialized_view 
belief which has the same argument values 
as the invocation user_keyword belief does not 
exist. A materialized_view belief represents a 
repetitive user information need whose 
content is extracted from each source, 
merged with relevant information from 
other sources, and stored as a belief by the 
mediator. The complementary condition on 
the existence of a materialized_view belief is 
specified by the context. The context helps 
for the selection of the most appropriate 
plan in a given situation.  
As soon as the invocation condition and 
the context are true, the sequence of actions 
or services specified in the plan body can be 
executed. The plan body of the DecompNmlRq 
plan is composed by the sequence of an 
action and a service. The mediator selects 
from their wrapper beliefs one or more 
wrappers (wp(+)) capable of translating the 
decomposed subqueries. Then, a translation 
service Ask(query_translation) is asked from the 
selected wrappers.  
The plan will only succeed if the 
statement described by the end state is 
successful. Moreover, SKwyRL-ADL also 
allows specifying what happens when a plan 
reaches its endstate or fails, by considering 
further courses of action or service. For 
example, the succeed specification of the 
DecompNmlRq plan counts the number of 
occurrences of the current subquery in order 
to identify a possible new materialized view, 
while the fail specification returns to the 
execution of the DecompMCRq plan. 
4.4.2. Security Model 
The security model is composed of four 
main design entities. An agent has zero or 
more protection objectives and each security 
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objective imposes one or more security 
constraints on the agent. Security 
constraints might restrict the goals and/or 
the capabilities of an agent. On the other 
hand, an agent owns security mechanisms. A 
security mechanism represents a set of 
standard security methods that an agent 
might have and they help towards the 
satisfaction of the protection objectives of 
the agent. A security method defines a 
sequence of actions and/or services to 
satisfy an agent’s security mechanisms. 
Protection Objective. A protection 
objective indicates a desirable security 
attribute that an agent might have, such as 
integrity, and availability. An agent might 
impose a security objective by itself or more 
likely a protection objective is imposed to 
an agent through its environment (e.g. from 
a security policy or through other agents 
and/or stakeholders/developers). Moreover, 
a protection objective alters the agent’s 
motivational state by adding constraint(s) to 
the agent with respect to security. A 
protection objective imposes one or more 
security constraints to an agent, and each 
agent might have zero or more protection 
objectives. A protection objective is 
specified as in Figure 14.  
 
[POname],  [POimposer]:=  self | environment 
ProtectionObjective 
 
name: POname 
imposed_by: POimposer 
imposed_to: Agent 
constraints:  ℙ SecurityConstraint 
 
 
Name ≠∅∧  imposed_to ≠∅∧  constraints ≠∅ 
 
(∀ po: ProtectionObjective) 
(∀ ag: Agent) (∀ sc: SecurityConstraint)   
[(sc  po) ∧ (po  ag)] ⇔ constrain(ag,sc) 
 
Fig. 14: Protection objective specification 
In particular, a Protection Objective 
specification is described by a name 
(Name), which assists to identify the 
Protection Objective, and an imposer 
(Imposed_by), which describes who imposes 
the Protection Objective to the agent. 
Imposed_to indicates the agent the 
Protection Objective is imposed to, and 
Constraints provides the set of security 
constraints imposed as a result of the 
specific protection objective.    
Referring to the Mediator agent 
specification, there are two protection 
objectives (Confidentiality_PO and 
Availability_PO). Following the Protection 
Objective specification of the proposed 
ADL, the Availability_PO is specified as 
shown in Figure 15. In particular, the 
Mediator agent is imposed an Availability 
Protection Objective from its Environment. 
As a result of this, a security constraint 
(ConfirmServiceAvailability) is imposed to 
the Mediator.  
 
Protection Objective: { 
name: Availability_PO 
imposed_by: Environment 
imposed_to: Mediator 
constraints: ConfirmServiceAvailability} 
Fig. 15: Availability_PO specification 
Security Constraint. A security 
constraint defines a set of restrictions to the 
goals and the capabilities of an agent. These 
restrictions are security related and are 
imposed by the agent’s environment (either 
from a security policy, other systems/agents, 
the developers or the stakeholders). When a 
security constraint restricts a goal, the agent 
must identify a possible way of achieving 
the goal without endanger the security 
constraint. On the other hand, when a 
security constraint restricts a capability (in 
reality the security constraint will restrict 
plans and/or events of the capability) the 
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agent must identify alternative ways of 
satisfying its goals without using the 
specific capability. It is possible that some 
restrictions are communication related. For 
instance, a restriction that might apply for 
the communication of one agent with 
another agent, might not apply for the 
communication of the same agent with a 
third agent or vice versa. Also, a security 
constraint might restrict the 
goals/capabilities of an agent for a specific 
time frame. For instance, a restriction that 
might apply today may not be valid 
tomorrow. A security constraint can be 
specified as in Figure 16. 
 
[SCname], [SCrestriction] :  Goal | Capability 
[SCtimeFrame]:=  All | Function,  
[SCcommunication]:=  Agent | All 
 
SecurityConstraint 
 
name: SCname 
restricts: SCrestriction 
timeFrame: SCtimeFrame 
constraints:  SCcommunication 
 
 
name ≠∅∧  restricts  ≠∅ 
 
(∀ ag: Agent)  [(g: Goal  ag)  (cap: Capability  ag) 
(sc: SecurityConstraint   ag)] restrict(g, sc) 
restrict(cap,sc) 
Fig. 16: Security constraint specification 
Going back to the Mediator specification, 
the ConfirmServiceAvailability security 
constraint restricts the Mediator’s Keep 
Materialized View Up-to-date goal at all 
times and for every communication. This is 
specified in Figure 17.  
 
Security Constraint: { 
name: ConfirmServiceAvailability_SC 
restricts: Keep_MaterialisedView_Uptodate 
timeFrame: All 
constraints: All 
}  
Fig. 17: ConfirmServiceAvailability_SCspecification 
Security Mechanism. A security 
mechanism represents a set of standard 
security methods that an agent might have 
and they help towards the satisfaction of the 
protection objectives of the agent.  The 
security mechanism allows structuring the 
security behaviour of an agent with respect 
to its security information. Internally, each 
security mechanism is structured by a set of 
different security methods, allowing system 
architects firstly to build up a library of 
different security methods, and secondly to 
build different security mechanisms for 
different agents of the system, by adding 
and removing security methods from the 
library. Because of this, a security 
mechanism could be either available or 
unavailable to an agent at a specific point of 
time. 
The security mechanism could be 
structured by different types of security 
methods. Some of them related to the 
detection of security breaches, some of them 
related to the prevention of security 
breaches, and some of them related to the 
recovery from security breaches. Therefore, 
the type of a security mechanism could be 
one of the following: (1) detecting: which 
involves only security methods that aim to 
detect anomalies; (2) preventing: which 
involves only security methods used to 
prevent security intrusions; (3) recovering:  
which involves security methods used only 
to recover after a security incident; (4) 
combinational: which involves security 
methods of all types. A security mechanism 
is specified in Figure 18. 
Going back to the GOSIS example, the 
Mediator agent has two security 
mechanisms (see Figure 2): Data Integrity 
and Authentication Exchange.  The Data 
Integrity security mechanism 
(DataIntegrity_SM) is composed of a 
security method (Error Detection), which is 
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available for the Mediator agent; it is a 
combinational type of Security Mechanism 
and it helps towards the Confidentiality 
Protection Objective of the agent. 
 
[SMname], [SMavailability]:=  Available| Unavailable 
[SMtype]:=  Detecting | Preventing | Recovering | 
 Combinational 
 
SecurityMechanism 
 
name: SMname 
composed_of :  ℙ SecurityMethod 
type: SMtype 
availability: SMavailability 
help: ℙ Protection Objective 
 
 
name ≠∅∧  composed_of ≠∅∧ type  ≠∅ 
 
(∀ SM: SecurityMechanism) (∃ ag : Agent ) • 
use(sm,ag) 
 
Fig. 18: Security mechanismspecification 
Using the Security mechanisms 
specification of the proposed language, the 
above example is specified as shown in 
Figure 19.  
 
Security Mechanism: { 
name: DataIntegrity_SM 
composed_of: Error_detection 
type: Combinational 
availability: Available 
help: Confidentiality }  
Fig. 19: DataIntegrity security mechanismspecification 
Security Method. A security method 
defines a sequence of actions and/or 
services such as cryptographic algorithms 
and secure protocols used to realise the 
protection objectives of the agent. Each 
security method consists of the following: 
• an entry condition, indicating the 
factor(s)  that cause the method to be 
triggered; 
• the security action, which specifies the 
actions/services that the agent needs to 
perform with respond to the security 
method invocation; 
• an end condition that specifies the 
desirable conditions of the security 
action; 
• the results report if the security action 
has failed or succeeded and what the 
next steps should be (these steps 
would be determined by whether the 
security action succeeded or failed). A 
security action has succeeded if and 
only if the output condition 
corresponds to an end condition. 
 
A security method is specified as in 
Figure 20. 
 
[SMETname], [SMEToutput]:= Success| Fail 
[SMETtype]:=Detect|Prevent|Recovery 
 
SecurityMethod 
 
name:SMETname 
type: SMETtype 
entry_condition: SMETentrycondition 
action:SMETaction 
end_condition:SMETdesirable 
output:SMEToutput 
next_step: SMETnextstep 
 
name ≠∅∧  type ≠∅∧ output  ≠∅ 
 
(∀ SMET: SecurityMethod) (∃ ag : Agent ) • 
use(smet,ag) 
 
Fig. 20: Security method specification 
Referring to the GOSIS example, previous 
analysis has identified that the Data 
Integrity security mechanism of the 
Mediator agent is composed of the Error 
Detection security method. Error detection 
is a method that allows some 
communication errors to be detected (for 
instance on communication between the 
 19
various agents of the system). The data is 
encoded so that the encoded data contains 
additional redundant information about the 
data. The data is decoded so that the 
additional redundant information must 
match the original information. This allows 
some errors to be detected. A number of 
error detection methods are currently used. 
For the sake of this paper we assume that 
the Mediator agent employs a Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) method. CRC is 
calculated by dividing the bit string of the 
block by a generator polynomial. The value 
of the cyclic redundancy check is the 
reminder of the calculation which is one bit 
shorter than the generator polynomial. 
Figure 21 shows an example of the CRC 
security method specification. 
 
Security Method: { 
name:CRC_SM 
type: Detect 
entry_condition:EncodedData 
action:RunCrcAlgortihm 
end_condition:NoError 
output:SMEToutput 
  }  
Fig. 21: Data Integrity security mechanism specification 
4.4.3. Architectural Model 
The main entities and relationships of the 
architectural model are illustrated in Figure 
1. It is composed of seven main design 
entities. It describes interactions among the 
agents that compose the MAS. 
Configurations are the central concept of 
architectural design, consisting of 
interconnected set of agents. The topology 
of a configuration is defined by a set of 
bindings between provided and required 
services. An agent interacts with its 
environment through an interface composed 
of sensors and effectors. An effector 
provides a set of services to the 
environment. A sensor requires a set of 
services from the environment. A service is 
performed by an agent that interacts by 
dialoguing with one or several agents. 
Finally, the whole MAS is specified with an 
architecture, which is composed of a set of 
configurations. The concept of architecture 
allows representing an agent by one or more 
detailed, lower-level configuration 
descriptions. In the rest of this section, we 
define and specify, using Z, each entity of 
this structural model. 
Interface. An interface defines a 
collection of connection points through 
which an agent interacts with its 
environment. An interface is a specification 
of how an agent appears to the rest of the 
system. Its primary constituents are a set of 
effectors and a set of sensors, which model 
the points through which an agent interacts. 
An effector provides a service for other 
agents and/or human users. A sensor 
requires a service from another agent and/or 
human user. For each interaction, there is 
always a correspondence between a service 
provided by an effector and a service 
required by a sensor, e.g. the send and 
receive request services of a client-server 
application.  
We specify an interface as a non-empty, 
finite set of effectors or sensors that represents 
the complete set of interaction points 
through which an agent communicates. 
These two basic interfaces are distinct, yet 
they share many characteristics. It can be 
useful (when appropriate) to consider them 
as specialisations of the same type. In Z, this 
can be accomplished by defining them as 
disjoint subsets of the Interface type. We 
introduce the AgentInterface type as the 
infinite set of all possible effectors and 
sensor definitions (Figure 22). 
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[AgentInterface]  
 
Interface 
 
effector: ℙ AgentInterface 
sensor: ℙ AgentInterface 
 
 
(effector, sensor)  partition  AgentInterface  
 
 
Fig. 22: Interface specification 
The predicate partition indicates that the 
sets of effectors and sensors are disjoint. We 
define an Effector (Figure 23) or a Sensor 
(Figure 24) as an individual connection 
point that defines a set of required or 
provided services.  
 
[EffectorName]  
 
Effector 
 
name: EffectorName 
provide:Service 
 
 
name ≠  ∅∧provide ≠  ∅ 
 
Fig. 23: Effector specification 
 
[SensorName]  
 
Sensor 
 
name: SensorName 
require:Service 
 
 
name ≠  ∅∧require ≠  ∅ 
 
Fig. 24: Sensor specification 
Referring to the GOSIS example, the 
Mediator needs the query_translation service 
that the Wrapper provides. Such interface 
definition points two aspects of an agent. 
Firstly, it indicates the expectations the 
agent has about the agents with which it 
interacts. Secondly, it reveals that the 
interaction relationships are a central issue 
of the architectural description. Such 
relationships are not only part of the 
specification of the agent behavior but 
reflect the potential patterns of 
communication that characterize the ways 
the system reason about itself. However, the 
required query translation service needs to 
be specified in greater detail. This is 
possible with the aid of a service.   
Service. A service is an operation 
performed by a sender agent that interacts 
by dialoguing with one or more receiver 
agents. We represent a service as a kind of 
action called speech act in the literature [3]. 
A speech act is an action available to 
communicate what an agent knows about 
the environment. It has the effect of 
changing the state of the environment just as 
any action. 
A service is specified using the model of 
action defined in Section 4.4.1, i.e., with 
preconditions and affects, as described in 
Figure 25.  
 
Service 
 
precondition: ℙ Belief 
body: AtomicService 
affect: Affect 
 
 
body ≠∅∧affect ≠∅ 
 
Fig. 25: Service specification 
We define an AtomicService (Figure 26) in 
the same way as a KQML [10] inter-agent 
communication. It consists of: 
a performative that names the services; a sender 
that identifies the agent initiating the 
services in the architecture; the reply-with that 
defines the information about which the 
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service expresses an interaction; a set of 
receivers that identify the agent’s interaction 
with the sender; the parameters that define the 
information required to execute the service; 
and an optional ontology that defines the 
agreed-upon terms that will be used in the 
exchange.  
 
[Performative] 
[Ontology] 
 
AtomicService 
 
name: Performative 
sender: Agent 
parameter: ℙ Term 
reply-with: Belief 
receiver: ℙ Agent 
ontology: Ontology 
 
 
name≠  ∅∧sender ≠  ∅∧receiver ≠  ∅ 
 
(∀ s: Service)  s.sender ≠ s.receiver 
 
(∀ s: Service) ∃ ag1: s. sender∧∃ ag2: s. 
receiver⇒  s.parameter  ∈ ag2.belief 
 
Fig. 26: AtomicService specification 
Referring back to the GOSIS case study, 
we can see (Figure 27) that the mediator 
(sender) initiates the service by asking the 
wrapper (receiver) to translate a query. To 
this end, the mediator provides to the 
wrapper a set of parameters allowing the 
definition of the contents of this query. Such 
mediator query is specified as belief with 
the predicate search and the following terms: 
search(RequestType,ProductType(+),FilteredKeyword(+)) 
Each term represents, respectively, the 
type of the request (normal or advanced in 
the case of multi-criteria refinement); the 
type of product; and one or more keywords 
that must be included in or excluded from 
the results. 
The Affect indicates that a new search 
belief is added to the Translation_Management 
knowledge base of the wrapper. 
 
Service:  
performative:  Ask(query_translation) 
sender:  Mediator 
parameters: rt: RequestType  ∧ pt:ProductType 
  ∧ fk(+):FilteredKeyword 
receiver: Wrapper 
Affect: Add(Translation_Management_KB, 
        search(rt,pt,fk(+)) 
Fig. 27: Example of service specification 
Configuration.  A configuration is an 
interconnected set of agent instances. A 
MAS modelled at the architectural level of 
design is represented as a configuration of 
instantiated agent components. The 
topology of the system is defined by a set of 
bindings between services provided by 
effector instances and services required by 
sensor instances. The configuration 
separates the descriptions of composite 
structures from the elements in those 
compositions. This allows reasoning about 
the composition as a whole and changing of 
the composition without having to examine 
each of the individual components in a 
system. Because there may be more than 
one uses of a given agent in a MAS, we 
distinguish the different instances of each 
agent type that appear in a configuration. To 
this end, in our ADL we define the type 
Instance representing the name given to an 
agent instance that has been instantiated 
within a configuration: [IAgent].  
Instantiating an agent also has the 
secondary effect of instantiating the services 
that are defined by its interface. We define 
provided and required service instance 
types: [IRService] and [IPService]. 
Once the instances have been declared, a 
configuration is completed by describing the 
collaborations. The collaborations define the 
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topology of the configuration, by showing 
which agent instance participates in which 
interactions. This is done by defining a one-
to-many mapping relation between provided 
and required services. A configuration can 
be then specified as in Figure 28. 
 
[AgentDescription] 
[IAgent] 
[Instance] :=  IAgent | IPService | IRService 
 
Configuration 
 
description: ℙ AgentDescription 
inst:ance: ℙ Instance 
collaboration:  (IAgent  X  IRService)  →  ( IAgent  
X  IPService) 
 
 
description ≠ ∅∧instance ≠ ∅∧collaboration ≠ ∅ 
 
Fig. 28: Configurationspecification 
Part of the GOSIS configuration with 
instance declarations and collaborations is 
given in Figure 29.  
“(min)...(max)” indicates the smallest 
acceptable integer, and the largest. An 
omitted cardinality (as is the case with 
(max) in the broker, mediator and wrapper 
agents), means no limitation. Dynamic and 
evolving structures can change at runtime. 
Such a configuration allows for dynamic 
reconfiguration and architecture 
resolvability at run-time. Configurations 
separate the description of composite 
structures from the description of the 
elements that form those compositions. This 
permits reasoning about the composition as 
a whole and allows reconfiguration without 
having to examine each component of the 
system. 
Architecture. Architecture models the full 
set of design information defined within an 
architectural specification. An important 
property for an ADL is to allow basic 
components in architecture to be replaced by 
(sub) configurations, in order to form new 
configurations.  
 
Configuration GOSIS 
Description 
Agent Broker[nb: 1…] 
Agent Mediator[nm: 1…] 
Agent Wrapper[nw: 1…nS]   
           /*with nS = number of information sources 
Agent Monitor[nmo: 1…nS] 
Agent Matchmaker 
Agent Multi-Critria-analyzer 
Service Tell(query_translation) 
Service Ask(query_translation) 
Service Achieve(result) 
Service Do(result) 
Service Tell(subscription_info) 
Service Ask(subscription_info) 
… 
Instance 
BRnb: Broker 
MEnm: Mediator 
WRnw: Wrapper 
MOnmo: Monitor 
MA: Matchmaker 
MCA: Multi-Criteria-Analyzer 
Tellquerytrans: Tell(query_translation) 
Askquerytrans: Ask(query_translation) 
Achres: Achieve(result) 
Dores: Do(result) 
Tellsubs: Tell(subscription_info) 
Asksubs: Ask(subscription_info) 
… 
Collaborations 
MEnm.Askquerytrans - Tellquerytrans.WRnw; 
MEnm.Achres --- Tellres.WRnw; 
MEnm.Asksubs --- Tellsubs.MA; 
… 
End GOSIS 
Fig. 29: Part of the GOSIS configuration 
This is usually referred to as hierarchical 
refinement in software architecture. To 
support hierarchical descriptions, SKwyRL-
ADL permits the representation of an agent 
by one or more detailed, lower-level 
descriptions. This is specified with the 
concept of architecture. The architecture 
models a complete specification. Each 
design has at least one configuration 
corresponding to the top-level system 
model. However, our model also supports 
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hierarchical system descriptions; that is, an 
agent may be further specified as being 
implemented by a configuration. An 
architecture maintains the set of all of the 
configurations that have been defined, and it 
can be specified as a non-empty set of 
configurations that has been defined in the 
specification (Figure 30). 
 
Architecture 
 
composed_of: ℙ Configuration 
 
 
composed_of ≠∅ 
 
Fig. 30: Architecture configuration 
5. The e-commerce system Case Study 
E-Media5 is a typical business-to-consumer 
application we have developed using the 
ADL described in the previous sections. The 
application offers an e-commerce 
architecture supporting the creation of 
information sources that facilitate the on-
line transaction of products, services, and 
payments resulting in an effective and 
efficient interaction among sellers, buyers 
and intermediaries.  
This section describes how we have 
applied SKwyRL ADL to formally specify 
architectural aspects of the system, such as 
interfaces, knowledge bases, and security 
mechanisms. In particular, in section 5.1, we 
introduce the case study and we discuss with 
the aid of secure Tropos [5] and i*[47] 
diagrams the analysis of the system, its 
requirements and the selected architectural 
style for the e-media system. In Section 5.2 
we illustrate how the proposed ADL was 
used to support the architectural description 
                                                 
5 (http://www.isys.ucl.ac.be/skwyrl/emedia) 
of the system by focusing on one of the 
system’s main components; the Billing 
Processor Agent. Then in section 5.3, we 
explain how the developed architectural 
solution was implemented and we provide 
illustrations of the system’s implementation. 
5.1. E-Media 
E-Media provides an on-line interface that 
allows customers to examine the items on 
the E-Media catalogue and place orders. 
Customers can search the on-line store by 
either browsing the catalogue or querying 
the item database. An online search engine 
allows customers to search title, author/artist 
and description fields through keywords or 
full-text search. If an item is not available in 
the catalogue, the customer has the option to 
order it. Moreover, Internet communications 
are supported. All web information (e.g., 
product and customer turnover, and sales 
average) of strategic importance is recorded 
for monthly or on-demand statistical 
analysis. Based on this statistical and 
strategic information, the system 
continuously manages and adapts the stock, 
pricing and promotions policy. For example, 
for each product, the system can decide to 
increase or decrease stocks or profit 
margins.  It can also adapt the customer on-
line interface with new product promotions.  
Apart from the main functional features of 
the system, security is a very important 
factor in the development of the E-Media 
system. Customers need to know that their 
information remains secure and accessible 
only to intended participants, and also that 
the risks, such as receiving wrong product 
because someone intercepted and changed 
the order, associated with online purchases 
are minimized. Therefore, from the 
customer’s point of view the main security 
objectives are confidentiality and integrity. 
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Confidentiality guarantees that the 
information is accessible only to authorized 
entities and inaccessible to others, whereas 
integrity guarantees that information 
remains unmodified from source entity to 
destination entity.  
On the other hand, the stakeholder of the 
E-Media system needs to make sure that the 
system will always be available for 
customers to buy; it can confirm the 
involvement of an entity in certain 
communications; and it can prove the 
identity of an entity. In other words, the 
main security objectives from the e-media’s 
stakeholder point of view are availability, 
non-repudiation, and authentication.  
 Availability guarantees the accessibility 
and the usability of information and 
resources to authorized entities, non 
repudiation confirms the involvement of an 
entity in certain communications, and 
authentication proves the identity of an 
entity.   
For both, the customer and the e-media 
stakeholder actors to satisfy their security 
objectives, some security constraints are 
imposed on their dependencies. Figure 31 
models the dependencies between the 
customer, the E-Media stakeholder and the 
E-Media system along with the security 
constraints imposed by the first two actors 
on the system, using the secure Tropos 
language [35] where each node represents 
an actor (or system component) and each 
link between two actors indicates a 
dependency. A dependency describes an 
“agreement” (called dependum) between 
two actors: the depender and the dependee. 
The depender is the depending actor, and the 
dependee, the actor who is depended upon. 
The type of the dependency describes the 
nature of the agreement. Goal dependencies 
represent delegation of responsibility for 
fulfilling a goal; soft-goal dependencies are 
similar to goal dependencies, but their 
fulfilment cannot be defined precisely; task 
dependencies are used in situations where 
the dependee is required. A Secure 
Dependency introduces security 
constraint(s) that must be respected by 
actors for the dependency to be satisfied 
[35]. This means that the depender expects 
from the dependee to satisfy the security 
constraint(s) and also that the dependee will 
make effort to deliver the dependum by 
satisfying the security constraint(s). 
Actors are represented as circles; 
dependums – goals, softgoals, tasks and 
resources – are respectively represented as 
ovals, clouds, hexagons and rectangles; 
dependencies have the form depender → 
dependum → dependee. Security constraints 
are represented as hexagons. 
 
 
Figure 31: E-Media dependencies 
Following the secure Tropos analysis 
process, the structure-in-5 organizational 
architectural style, presented in [23], was 
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identified as suitable for the e-media system. 
More information about alternative 
architectural selections can be found in [13]. 
According to the structure-in-5 style, the 
organisation of the software architecture can 
be considered an aggregate of five sub-
structures [33]. The Operational Core, 
which carries out the basic tasks and 
procedures directly linked to the production 
of products and services; the Strategic 
Appex, which makes executive decisions 
ensuring that the organization fulfills its 
mission in an effective way and defines the 
general strategy of the organization in its 
environment. 
The Middle Line, which establishes a 
hierarchy of authority between the Strategic 
Apex and the Operational Core; the 
Technostructure, which serves the 
organization by making the work of others 
more effective, typically by standardising 
work processes, outputs and skills; the 
Support, which provides specialized 
services, at various levels of the hierarchy, 
outside the basic operating workflow.  
These sub-structures are realized in the case 
of the e-media architecture by the Store 
Front, the Back Store, the Billing Processor, 
the Coordinator and the Decision Maker, as 
shown in Figure 32.  
The Store Front interacts with customers 
and provides them with a usable front-end 
web application for consulting, searching 
and shopping media items. The Back Store 
constitutes the support component. It 
manages the product database and 
communicates to the Store Front relevant 
product information. To be able to produce 
statistical information (e.g., analyses, 
average charts and turnover reports), the 
Back Store stores and backs up all the 
appropriate web information about 
customers, products and sales. Such kind of 
information is analysed either for a 
predefined product (when the Coordinator 
asks it) or on a monthly basis for every 
product. Based on this monthly statistical 
analysis, strategic information (e.g., sales 
increase or decrease, performance charts, 
best sales, and sales prevision) is also 
provided to the Decision Maker.  
 
 
Figure 32: The E-Media Architecture in Structure-in-5 
The Billing Processor handles customer 
orders and bills. To this end, it provides the 
customer with on-line shopping cart 
capabilities. It also handles, under the 
responsibility of the Coordinator, stock 
orders to avoid shortages or congestions. 
Finally, it ensures the secure management of 
financial transactions for the Decision 
Maker. The Coordinator assumes the central 
position of the architecture. It is responsible 
to implement strategic decisions for the 
Decision Maker. It supervises and 
coordinates the activities of the Billing 
Processor (initiating the stock and pricing 
policy), the Front Store (adapting the front 
end interface with new promotions and 
recommendations) and the Back Store 
(parameterize statistical computing) 
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ensuring that the system fulfils its mission in 
an effective way. Finally, the Decision 
Maker assumes strategic roles. It defines the 
strategic behaviour (e.g., sales and turnover, 
product visibility, and hits) of the system 
ensuring that objectives and responsibilities 
delegated to the Billing Processor, 
Coordinator and Back Store are consistent 
with respect to their capabilities. 
5.2.  Architectural Description 
The initial analysis of the case study, as 
partially presented in the previous section, 
provides an organizational representation of 
the system-to-be including relevant actors, 
security constraints and their respective 
goals, tasks and resource inter-
dependencies. Such analysis can serve as a 
basis to understand and discuss the 
assignment of system functionalities and 
security issues but it is not adequate to 
provide a precise specification of the system 
details. As introduced in the previous 
sections, SKwyRL-ADL provides a finite 
set of formal agent-oriented constructors 
that allow detailing, in a formal and 
consistent way, the software architecture as 
well as its agent components, their 
behaviours and the corresponding security 
issues. The rest of the section describes the 
specification, in SKwyRL-ADL, of one of 
the main components of the e-media system 
as introduced in 5.1 and 5.2; the Billing 
Processor agent. Focusing on this 
component of the system allows us to 
demonstrate the applicability of the 
proposed ADL and also in the same time to 
keep the description to a reasonable and 
manageable length. For a complete 
specification of the E–Media case study, we 
refer the reader to [14]. 
There are five main aspects of the Billing 
Processor (BP) agent that need to be 
considered: the Interface representing the 
interactions in which the agent will 
participate; the Knowledge Base defining 
the agent knowledge capacity, the 
Protection Objectives indicating the desired 
security attributes of the agent, the Security 
Mechanisms representing a set of standard 
security methods that an agent might have 
and help towards the satisfaction of the 
protection objectives of the agent, and the 
Capabilities defining agent behaviours.  
In particular, the Billing Processor agent 
Interface consists of a number of effectors 
and sensors for the agent. Effectors provide 
services to other agents, and sensors require 
services provided by other agents. An 
interaction is then defined by the 
correspondence between a required and a 
provided service. As shown in Figure 33 the 
BP agent’s interface consists of four 
effectors and two sensors.   
Agent:{Billing-Processor 
Interface 
Effector[provide(shopping_cart)] 
Effector[provide(billing)] 
Effector[provide(stock_orders)] 
Effector[provide(finance_security)] 
Sensor[require(strategic_behavior)] 
Sensor[require(statistical_info)] 
KnowledgeBase: 
Stock_KB Pricing_Kb 
BP_Customer_KB     Providers_KB 
BP_System_KB Statistical_KB 
Protection Objectives: 
Confidentiality_PO Integrity_PO 
Availability_PO Non_Repudiation_PO 
Authentication_POAccessControl_PO 
Security mechanisms: 
Encipherment_SMDIgitalSignature_SM 
AccessControl_SM DataIntegirty_SM 
AuthenticationExchange_SM 
TrafficPadding_SMRoutingControl_SM 
Notarization_SM 
Capabilities: 
Shopping_Cart_Management_CP 
Billing_CP Stock_Management_CP 
Statistic_CP 
} 
Figure 33: Billing Processor agent specification 
 27
Moreover, the BP agent has a number of 
knowledge bases related to customers, 
providers, pricing and stock as well as a 
number of protection objectives, such as 
(amongst others) confidentiality, integrity, 
and  availability. The BP agent also has a 
number of security mechanisms, such as 
access control and notarization, as well as a 
number of capabilities, such as stock 
management and billing. 
Once all the five aspects have been 
defined, more detail specifications are 
constructed for each one of these. For 
instance, the BP agent Interface components 
are further specified. In particular, each 
provided or required service can be detailed 
by describing the sender agent that initiates 
the service, a set of receiver agents that 
interact with the sender, the “reply-with” 
that defines the information with which the 
service expresses an interaction, and 
optionally a set of parameters that define the 
information required to execute the service. 
The parameters as well as the “reply-with” 
information can be represented with a belief 
or a set of terms (e.g., function, constant or 
variable) as shown in Figure 34.  
 
Service: {Ask(statistical_info) 
sender: Coordinator 
parameters:(tw:TimeWindows),(id:Id_product)  
reply_with:  to: Turnover ∨ sl: Sales 
receiver: Back-Store 
Effect:Add(Statistical_KB, 
Achieve(statistic(“today”,“on_product”)} 
Figure 34: Ask statistical specification 
As discussed above, the BP agent has six 
KBs. Following the ADL specification for 
Knowledge Bases, introduced in the 
previous sections, each KB is specified with 
a name, a KB_body and a KB_type. For 
example, the specification of the 
Statistical_KB for the BP agent is shown in 
Figure 35. 
That specification describes the formal 
knowledge that the BP agent has with 
respect to the statistical analysis required. 
As shown in Figure 35, this includes, 
amongst other things, product turnover, 
customer turnover and product sales. Since 
the BP agent only knows the beliefs 
included in its KB, the type of the Statistical 
KB is closed world.  
 
KnowledgeBase: {Statistical_KB  
KB_body:  
statistic_computation(Date,Subject) 
product_turnover(Id_Prod,TimeWindows,Turnover) 
customer_turnover(Id_Card,TimeWindows,Turnove) 
product_sales(Id_Prod,TimeWindows,Sales) 
extrapol_sales(Id_Prod,TimeWindows,setoffSales)  
KB_type: closed_world } 
Figure 35: Statistical Knowledge Base for BP specification  
The high-level specification of the BP 
agent indicates that the agent has six (6) 
protection objectives. These protection 
objectives have been identified by the 
security analysis that took place for the e-
media system and partially presented in 
section 5.1. In particular, the initial security 
constraints (illustrated in Figure 31) were 
further analysed into secure goals and plans 
which in turn allowed us to identify a 
number of protection objectives to satisfy 
the secure goals and plans of the BP agent. 
Following the ADL structure and in 
particular the Protection Objective 
specification (as presented in previous 
sections), each of protection objective of the 
BP agent is specified with a name, 
information of who imposed it to the agent, 
the agent to which it is imposed to (in this 
case the Billing Processor), and the 
constraints that it imposes to the agent. For 
example, the specification of the 
Non_Repudiation Protection Objective is 
illustrated in Figure 36. 
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Protection Objective: { 
name: Non_Repudiation_PO 
imposed_by: Environment 
imposed_to: Billing_Processor 
constraints: ConfirmInvolvementInTransactions} 
Figure 36: Non Repudiation  Protection Objective specification 
Our security analysis, during the analysis 
stage of the development process, indicated 
that the BP agent should have 8 different 
security mechanisms in order to satisfy its 
security requirements.  Following the 
specification for Security Mechanisms 
presented in the previous section, each 
security mechanism is specified with a 
name, the security methods it is composed 
of, a type, its availability to the agent, and 
an indication to which protection objective 
helps. For instance, the Notarization security 
mechanism specification for the Billing 
Processor agent is shown in Figure 37. It is 
important to emphasise that the notarisation 
mechanism is provided by a third-party 
notary, which must be trusted by all 
participants. The notary can assure integrity, 
origin, time or destination of data. For 
example, a message that has to be submitted 
by a specific deadline may be required to 
bear a time stamp from a trusted time 
service proving the time of submission.  
Security Mechanism: { 
name: Notarization_SM 
composed_of: third_party_notary 
type: Combinational 
availability: Available 
help: Non_Repudiation} 
Figure 37: Notarization security mechanism specification  
The Billing Processor agent has also some 
capabilities. A capability is composed of 
plans and events that together serve to give 
an agent certain abilities. For example, the 
Billing Processor Statistic_CP capability is 
specified as shown in Figure 38. The body 
contains the plans that the capability can 
execute and the events it can post to be 
handled by other plans or it can send to 
other agents. 
Capability:{Statistic_CP  
CP_body:  
Plan Prov_Turnover_On_Demand 
Plan Prov_Turnover 
Plan Sales_Average 
Plan Stock_Orders 
SendEvent Grade 
SendEvent Best_Sales 
SendEvent Promotion 
} 
Figure 38: Billing Processor Statistic_CP capability specification 
The Stock_Order plan of the Billing-
Processor (Figure 39) ensures that the level 
of stock of each product is constantly higher 
than the minimal quantity, which is 
determined by the coordinator on the basis 
of the strategic orientation provided by the 
Decision-Maker. 
Plan:{ 
Name: Stock_Orders 
invoc:   
 Maintain(current_stock(id,Availability > lb) 
// with id: Id_Product  
// From Coordinator.Ask(stock_orders).reply_with 
// with lb: Lower_Bound  
// From Coordinator.Ask(stock_orders).reply_with  
context:  
current_stock(id,Availability < lb)  
∧¬ time (now > “11 am”)  
∧ (day(now =“monday”  
∨ day(now =“wednesday”) 
body: 
action: proceed_order(id, lb)   
effect:Add(Stock_Kb, 
Sent_Orders(id,qu,date))  
endstate:  
Add(Stock_Kb, Sent_Orders(id,qu,date)) 
succeed:  
action: update_stock(id, av) 
//with av: availability 
effect: Add(Stock_Kb, Stock(id, av)) 
fail:  
action: search_last(sent_orders(),id)  as 
 qu: Quantity 
Add(Stock_Kb,Sent_Orders(id,qu,d 
ate)) 
update_stock(id, av) 
effect: Add(Stock_Kb, Stock(id, av)) 
} 
Figure 39: Stock_Order plan specification 
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In the plan body, the quantity to order is 
determined and then the order is sent to the 
publisher. Eventually, the level of stock is 
updated in the system. In case of plan 
failure, the “fail” instructions are carried 
out. So the Billing Processor searches for 
the last order sent for this product and it 
reorders the same quantity. Then the stock 
level is updated with the quantity ordered.  
 
5.3. E-Media Implementation 
Following the analysis of the system 
(partially presented in 5.1) and the 
specification of its architecture (partially 
presented in 5.2), the next step included the 
implementation of the system based on the 
developed architecture. In the rest of this 
section, we briefly describe the E-Media 
implementation to illustrate the roles of the 
agents (Front Store, Decision Maker, Back 
Store, Coordinator and Billing Processor) 
identified in 5.1 and their interaction. We 
also focus the discussion on implementation 
aspects of the Billing Processor agent 
described in section 5.2. The E-Media 
application was implemented (~ 10.000 
lines of code) using JACK [26]; a BDI 
agent-oriented development environment for 
JAVA.  
When an on-line customer gets connected 
to E-media, an instance of the Front-Store is 
created to display an interface that allows 
the user to sign in. Then, the Back-Store 
handles the information provided by the user 
and checks its validity. If the access is 
granted, the user can purchase products on 
E-Media by adding catalogue items to the 
shopping cart managed by the Billing-
Processor. At any time the user can use a 
navigation-bar to switch from one section of 
the website to another. Moreover, 
promotions and best sales are part of the 
strategic behaviour objective. The 
promotions’ policy is initiated by the 
Decision-Maker based on the strategic 
information provided by the Back-Store. 
The Coordinator chooses the best 
promotions and consequently adapts the 
Store Front layout. The Coordinator acts 
similarly for the best sales: the Back-Store 
computes the five best sellers and the 
Coordinator accordingly updates the Store-
Front. Figure 40 illustrates the Store-Front 
interface for the DVD section.  
To search the E-Media DVD catalogue, 
the user must fill in at least one field of the 
search engine (see section 1 in Figure 40). 
The Store-Front sends the query parameters 
to the Back Store which provides the results 
back to the Store-Front (see section 2 in 
Figure 40). 
At any moment during the session, the 
user can click on a product (best seller, 
query result, and shopping cart); a request is 
then sent to Back Store to provide more 
information on this product (see section 3 in 
Figure 40). 
 
 
Figure 40: Interface of e-media DVD section 
The implementation for the Billing 
Processor has followed the architectural 
description presented in the previous section 
(5.2). In particular, when a user starts the 
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billing process, the Billing Processor agent 
invokes the shopping cart and billing 
effectors and displays all the items of the 
shopping cart and it computes the total and 
sub-total for each product. It then employs a 
number of its KBs, POs and SMs to validate 
the user id and process the payment card. As 
discussed in the previous section (5.2) a 
third party is used to support the 
notarization security mechanism of the BP 
agent. During all this time, the BP agent 
communicates with the user, through user 
messages on the screen, as illustrated in 
Figure 41, by employing its sensors and 
effectors. Once the payment is accepted, the 
Billing Processor uses again its interface to 
communicate with the Store-Front. 
Furthermore, a confirmation message is 
displayed and the shopping cart is cleared. 
 
 
Figure 41: Secure Payment Information. 
6. Related Work 
 
Over the past decade, the field of software 
architecture has received increasing 
attention as an important subfield of 
software engineering. Practitioners have 
come to realise that getting an architecture 
“right” is a critical success factor for system 
design and development. They have begun 
to recognise the value of making explicit 
architectural descriptions and choices in the 
development of new systems. In this 
context, a number of researches have 
proposed architectural description languages 
([2], [17], [28], [30] and [39]) for 
representing and analysing architectural 
designs. In particular, a number of 
Architectural Description Languages 
(ADLs) have been proposed such as 
Rapide[29], Darwin[32], Aseop[18], 
Unicon[39],Wright [2] and ACME[17]. 
However, these efforts have not been 
undertaken with agent orientation in mind, 
and therefore the resulted languages are not 
applicable for specifying MAS 
architectures. Nevertheless, the study and 
careful examination of the above efforts has 
enable us to identify the essential aspects 
that any ADL should be able to specify, and 
develop the common foundation of concepts 
and concerns for the language proposed in 
this paper (see Section 4 for details). On the 
other hand, few efforts have been made to 
define an architectural description language 
(ADL) for MAS. MAS-adl[10]is a simple 
customized architectural description 
language for MAS used to describe the 
various classes of agents involved in the 
MAS and the interconnections between their 
instances. In particular, for any given class 
the architectural description provides 
information about the kind of the 
architecture; the interpreters and the services 
of agents in that class. ADLMAS [48] is an 
architectural description language for MAS, 
which adopts Object-Oriented Petri nets as a 
formal theory basis. ADLMAS is suitable 
for representing concurrent, distributed and 
synchronous MAS. ADLMAS can visually 
and intuitively depict a formal framework 
for MAS, from the agent level and social 
level, which describes the static and 
dynamic semantics, and analyse, simulate 
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and validate MAS and interactions among 
agents with formal methods. Similarly Yu et 
al. [49], have developed a MAS ADL based 
on π-net. The proposed ADL supports the 
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model and it 
makes use of two formalisms, namely 
Agent-Oriented Petri nets (AOPN) and π-
calculus.  AOPNs are used to visualize the 
static architecture and model the behaviors 
of the MAS under development, while π-
calculus is used to represent the dynamic 
architecture of MAS. These works are 
important, but they fail to adequately 
consider the issue of security in MAS.  
There is, of course, a large effort of works 
in the area of MAS, with respect to security. 
These include policy specification languages 
(for example [23],[4]), Trust and Reputation 
mechanisms(for example [20], [22], [30]), 
agent-oriented software engineering 
methodologies for the analysis and design of 
secure MAS [35], security patterns[36], and 
security mechanisms and protocols [4]. 
Although such works do not directly input 
into our proposed language; their study has 
enable us to consider a variety of security 
considerations, issues and challenges faced 
for the development of secure MAS and 
therefore develop a security model for the 
proposed ADL that supports appropriate 
architectural concepts.  
7. Conclusion 
Today’s information systems must be 
based on open architectures to accommodate 
new components and meet fast evolving 
requirements. MAS architectures provide an 
effective way to design such systems since 
they do support open and evolving 
configurations that can change at run-time to 
exploit the services of new agents, or 
replace existing ones.  
Based on the analysis of existing classical 
ADLs, security consideration for multi-
agent systems and the BDI agent model, this 
article has defined a set of system 
architectural concepts to propose an ADL 
for secure BDI-MAS. This ADL allows 
specification of agent components (such as 
knowledge base, interface and capabilities), 
agent behaviour (such as belief, goal and 
plan), agent security (such as security 
constraints, protection objectives and 
security mechanisms) and agent interactions 
(such as service and configuration). 
The research reported here calls for 
further work. We are currently working on: 
- the development of a CASE tool to 
automatically generate the code skeleton 
of the future multi-agent information 
system from their specification with the 
ADL;  
- the definition of a set of rules to perform 
consistency analysis that could be 
included in commercial verification tools 
such as PVS (http://pvs.csl.sri.com/);  
- the identification of a suitable set of core 
abstractions, inspired by an 
organizational metaphor, to be used 
during the design of multi-agent systems; 
- the development of a clear methodology, 
centred around these organizational 
abstractions, for the design of multi-agent 
systems architectures.  
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